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INTRODUCTION 
Sections I through III comprise the Brief of Cross-Appellees portion of this brief. 
Sections IV through VI comprise the Reply Brief of Appellants portion of this brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Setting Aside the Default 
Judgment Against Owner and Contractor. 
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), the "Court may in furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for [...] 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Although "a trial court has broad 
discretion in deciding whether to set aside a default judgment" under Rule 60(b), "the 
trial court's decision is not unlimited." Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, f 9, 11 P.3d 277. 
"Indeed the [disfavored] nature of a default judgment and the equitable nature of rule 60 
provide ... limits." Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings, LLC, 2008 UT App 277, \ 
23, 191 P.3d 39. A "district court should exercise its discretion in favor of granting relief 
so that controversies can be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities." Menzies 
v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, \ 54, 150 P.3d 480 (citing State v. Musselman, 667 P.3d 1053, 
1055-56 (Utah 1983)). 
Owner and Contractor were previously represented by Lewis M. Francis, of Jones 
Waldo, who filed an answer and counterclaim on April 26, 2006 to the cross claim filed 
by Subcontractor. R. 116-125. Significant legal work, such as discovery and other 
matters were then exchanged between the parties, depositions were held, and the parties 
attempted to resolve their disputes through mediation. See generally, R. 135-252. A 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dispute between Owner and Contractor and another attorney at Jones Waldo occurred, 
and Owner and Contractor asked to meet with the president of the firm. R. 311. Without 
further contact from Mr. Francis explaining his withdrawal and its effects, Mr. Francis 
sent by regular mail a Notice of Withdrawal that did not inform Owner and Contractor 
the effects of such a withdrawal. Id. Pieces of regular mail received by Owner and 
Contractor's staff from Mr. Francis and his office were understood to be common client 
courtesy copies, which were customarily received by staff members of Owner and 
Contractor throughout the proceeding. R. 312. Documents and legal matters that were 
believed at the time to still be handled by Mr. Francis and which arrived via regular mail 
were filed away by staff as a matter of course without alerting management. Id. The 
Notice to Appoint sent by Subcontractor was also sent via regular mail. Id. Given that 
both the Notice of Withdrawal and Notice to Appoint were sent via regular mail, staff did 
not realize that Owner and Contractor were no longer represented by counsel, and did not 
bring this to management's attention. Id. Only after Owner and Contractor failed to 
obtain new counsel did Shamrock assert that Owner and Contractor's Answer and 
Counterclaim were frivolous and make a motion to strike the Answer and Counterclaim 
and enter a Default Judgment. R. 262-80. A default judgment was entered against 
Owner and Contractor on March 5, 2009. R. 284-86. Current counsel for Owner and 
Contractor entered their appearance on March 23, 2009, and filed a Motion and 
Memorandum to Set Aside Judgment. R. 314-26. The motion was granted. R. 363-68. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. Subcontractor Does Not Show That the Trial Court Abused its Discretion in 
Granting Owner and Contractor's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, 
and Reargues Facts without Properly Marshaling the Evidence. 
In Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agla Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980), with 
facts similar to the present controversy, defendant's former counsel withdrew from the 
ongoing litigation, the notice to appoint counsel was misplaced with numerous papers 
served upon defendant's office by mail, and upon receiving the notice of judgment, 
defendant immediately contacted new counsel, who proceeded to prepare a motion based 
on Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) and which was filed within 17 days of receiving notice of 
judgment. 611 P.2d at 370-71. The defendant in Interstate Excavating claimed the 
justification for its default rested primarily on confusion and service of notice by ordinary 
mail. Id. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court and held that under these 
circumstances justice was best served by allowing the parties to try the issues on the 
merits. Id. The Court stated: 
"[Default judgments] are not favored in the law, especially where a party has 
timely responded with challenging pleadings ... [A]ccess to the courts for the 
protection of rights and the settlement of disputes is one of the most important 
factors in the maintenance of a peaceable and well-ordered society ... The 
uniformly acknowledged policy of the law is to accord litigants the opportunity 
for a hearing on the merits, where that can be done without serious injustice to the 
other party. To that end, the courts are generally indulgent toward the setting 
aside of default judgments where there is a reasonable justification or excuse for 
the defendant's failure to appear, and where timely application is made to set it 
aside, the doubt should resolved in favor of doing so, to the end that each party 
may have an opportunity to present his side of the controversy and that there be a 
resolution in accordance with law and justice. 
M a t 370-71. 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Other authority also indicates that in the event of the withdrawal of former counsel 
leading to confusion and a default judgment, the court may look to whether the party 
acted promptly upon discovery of the fact that it was unrepresented by counsel. See 10A 
Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d § 2695 (201 l)("judgment may be vacated when the default is 
due to [...] confusion resulting from the withdrawal of counsel")(citing Thorpe v. Thorpe, 
364 F.2d 692 (Ct. App. D.C. Cir. 1966); Bridoux v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 214 F.2d 207 (Ct. 
App. D.C. Cir. 1954); Keegel v. Key West & Caribbean Trading Co., 627 F.2d 372 (Cit. 
App. D.C. Cir. 1980); Bavouset v. Shaw's of San Francisco, 43 F.R.D. 296 (S.D. Texas 
1967); Minneapolis Brewing Co. v. Merritt, 143 F. Supp. 146 (D.C.N.D. 1956)). Upon 
learning of their former counsel's withdrawal, Owner and Contractor immediately 
retained the undersigned law firm as new counsel, who filed an entry of appearance and 
motion to set aside within ten business days of the default judgment. See R. 314-26. 
Due diligence is defined as conduct that is consistent with the manner in which a 
reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances would have acted. See Menzies, 
2006 UT 81, f 72. The trial court issued a five-page memorandum decision, granting 
Contractor's motion to set aside the default judgment in question. See R. 363-68. It 
analyzed both the legal underpinnings and factual circumstances in granting Owner and 
Contractor's motion. The trial court addressed Owner and Contractor's conduct, stating 
that "given the situation with counsel and the lack of personal contact and a long-term 
relationship, the court will again excuse defendants failures." R. 366. In its brief, 
Subcontractor fails to demonstrate that the trial court ruled incorrectly or abused its 
discretion in setting aside the default judgment, but instead mainly reargues its own 
4 
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version of facts and offers conclusions and opinions with regard to actions taken by 
Owner and Contractor. 
Subcontractor has also not satisfied its burden to marshal the evidence supporting 
any of the findings made by the trial court in its memorandum decision, and has failed to 
demonstrate why any findings are lacking in support. "In order to challenge a court's 
factual findings, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding 
and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even 
when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." Osborne v. Osborne, 2011 
Utah App 150, fn. 1 (quoting Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, If 76, 100 P.3d 1177). 
Subcontractor has not done this. At most, Subcontractor attacks the affidavit on which 
the trial court's decision rests by declaring the affiant, Alan Wright "not competent," 
which Subcontractor argues for the first time in its brief. Brief of Appellee, p. 26. Rather 
than addressing the trial court's rationale, Subcontractor "fails to present a substantial 
question for review warranting further consideration" and mainly "reargues [its] own 
version of the facts." Ivie v. Dep 7 of Workforce Servs., 2011 UT App 13, If 11, 246 P.3d 
1214. Subcontractor also asserts that the "court's ruling was not based on adequate 
findings of fact nor on the law." Brief of Appellee, p. 29 (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). Again, no argument is provided to support or address this assertion, 
and Subcontractor only continues to reargue facts. 
Utah case law provides that the Court should balance the equities of setting aside a 
default judgment on a case-by-case basis, and should resolve any doubt in favor of setting 
the default judgment aside. Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986); see also 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Interstate Excavating, 611 P.2d 369. As the trial court made a finding that there was due 
diligence and excusable neglect on the part of Contractor, as Subcontractor has failed in 
its burden to marshal the evidence in attempting to attack the trial court's findings and 
ruling, and as there exists a strong presumption in favor of decisions on the merits, the 
trial court's decision to set aside the default judgment in question should be affirmed. 
II. Subcontractor Did Not Recover in Quantum Meruit as the Trial Court Found 
that an Express, Integrated Contract Existed. Moreover, Subcontractor Never 
Preserved this Issue at the Trial Court. 
Subcontractor argues that this matter should be remanded to the trial court for a 
determination of its pleaded quantum meruit claim, since no findings were made as to 
this issue. Brief of Appellee, p. 30. 
Quantum Meruit does not appear to be preserved or argued at the trial court. In 
cursorily reviewing over 650 pages of trial transcripts, Contractor and Owner have found 
only one instance where quantum meruit was referenced by Subcontractor, and this was 
only briefly in the summation. See R. 901, p. 27. 
Accordingly, this issue was not tried by Subcontractor, nor has it been preserved 
for purposes of appeal. See generally R. 899-901. "[I]n order to preserve an issue for 
appeal the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has 
an opportunity to rule on that issue." Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 
UT 48, Tf 14, 48 P.3d 968 (citing Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844 (Utah 
1998)); State ex rel D.B., 2010 UT App 111, If 6, 231 P.3d 819. To preserve the issue, 
"[Appellants] must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority [in the trial 
court]. " Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f 15, 164 P.3d 366. "The mere mention of an 
6 
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issue without introducing . . . relevant legal authority does not preserve that issue for 
appeal" State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(internal quotation 
omitted). "[A] party may not claim to have preserved an issue for appeal by 'merely 
mentioning . . . an issue without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority."5 Pratt, 2007 UT 41,1j 15 (internal citation omitted). 
Furthermore, Subcontractor's argument that it could recover under quantum 
meruit in this instance is flawed. 
Quantum meruit is an action initiated by a plaintiff to recover payment for labor 
performed in a variety of circumstances in which that plaintiff, for some, reason, 
would not be able to sue on an express contract. Recovery under quantum meruit 
presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract exists. 
Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)(citation omitted); see also 
Karapanos v. Boardwalk Fries, Inc., 837 P.2d 576 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)(finding that 
where an enforceable contract between the parties exists, "quantum meruit is not 
applicable"); Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(explaining that only where there is no enforceable contract may recovery under quantum 
meruit be appropriate); Scheller v. Dixie Six Corp., 753 P.2d 971 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); 
Highland Constr. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984) 
("damages are controlled by the contractual remedies fashioned by the parties unless it 
can be shown that the work performed was so different from the work contemplated by 
the contract that additional recovery in quantum meruit is warranted"); E & MSales 
West, Inc. v. BechtelJacohs Co., 2009 UT App 299, \ 8, 221 P.3d 838; Uhrhahn Constr. 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
& Design, Inc. v. Hopkins, 2008 UT App 41, f 11 179 P.3d 808 (finding that a party 
cannot recover under both express and implied contracts). 
The trial court found that an express, integrated contract existed between 
Contractor and Subcontractor (see R. 536; see also Ex. D-2, § 29; App. B-l), and 
Subcontractor was awarded judgment due to the trial court's determination that 
Contractor had breached that contract (R. 689). 
Subcontractor's argument presupposes, then, either that it is entitled to prevail 
upon inconsistent theories of recovery (once under the express, integrated contract and 
once again under quantum meruit) or that the work it performed for the project was 
outside the contract and that Contractor had waived the requirement for contractual 
modifications to be in writing. Neither argument was presented at trial, and neither is 
persuasive. See R. 899-901. Subcontractor has shown no reason why the express, 
integrated contract between the parties is unenforceable or inapplicable. See id. 
While Subcontractor is correct that parties to a construction contract can waive a 
contract provision that requires changes be made in writing (see Uhrhahn, 2008 UT App 
41, Tflf 13-21), Subcontractor fails to point to any evidence or citation in the record that 
would meet the "requisite showing" that the parties waived the contractual provision 
requiring all modifications to the contract be made in writing. See Uhrhahn, 2008 UT 
App 41, % 16; see also Ex. D-2, § 29; App. B-l; R. 899-901. As Uhrhahn emphasizes, 
"to prove that the owner intended to waive such a provision, the evidence must be of a 
clear and satisfactory character and clearly show a distinct agreement that the work be 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
deemed extra work and a definite agreement with the owner to pay extra for such extra 
work." 2008 UT App 41 at 1j 15. 
Finally, Subcontractor misstates material findings related to this section of its 
argument. In support of its conclusions, Subcontractor represents that "[t]he boiler has 
never been a problem. It worked, and it still works [ ] Despite the fact that the 
system works and has worked for nearly 7 years, to the benefit of Daedalus and Silver 
Baron, the [trial] court arbitrarily reduced the amount due and payable to Shamrock." 
Brief of Appellee, p. 33. According to this line of thought, Subcontractor believes it is 
entitled to additional recovery under quantum meruit. See id. 
However, in contrast to Subcontractor's appraisals of the quality of its own work 
and installation of the boiler, the trial court found that: 
The boiler had two components, one of which ran the water at 180 degrees and it 
circulated through the building and provided the heat. It was to be cooled by the 
other function, cooler water that ran the culinary water, for showers and washing 
and such, at 120 degrees. In fact Shamrock had failed to put a mixer valve in 
which affected the flow of water through the building and the cooler water from 
the culinary system was not being mixed with the original 180 degree water and so 
the radiant air was always too hot, unless the boiler was turned down to 110 or 
some lower temperature. When that new mixer valve was installed, the over 
heating problem ceased. The court finds that Shamrock did not do the work 
properly and did not install that mixer valve properly originally until mid February 
2005. 
R. 684-85; see also K.6%9.1 
1
 Additionally, throughout its brief, Subcontractor implies, or states explicitly, such as on 
page 35, that Contractor designed the mechanical system. See Brief of Appellee, pp. 17, 
35, and 37. This is inaccurate. Contractor, as part of a pre-construction consulting 
contract with Owner, did provide suggestions and other input during the design phase of 
the project. R. 900, p. 26. This input was given to the Owner's architect and the Owner's 
mechanical engineering firm as to the entire hotel and condominium project, including 
the mechanical system. R. 900, pp. 26-27. But Contractor did not design the mechanical 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In addition, the trial court found that Subcontractor bivaciiLu u^ agreement by 
i " • '>* 689)(concluding that such breach w as "a most material breach"), that the boilers 
and related venting system substituted h\ Subcontractor were installed without notice to 
Contractor, were not equivalent unu in\ O\\-LU a s> stem that Conti actoi did not IA< ant (R. 
685, 689), that Si lbcontractoi "s falli ire to prope rb • Install a mixer valv e caused serious 
overheating problems of the building even months afk - ''substantial completion" (R 682-
8* 689Xconcluding thai Subcontractor did not M-;h, .,
 v;:i\ prvM;en> ai;u u v. .:; . u. 
responsible for either replacement of the substituted bciier and allied \ ailing -\ stei >i 
the cost of having another subcontractor provide such work and equipment (R. 6% e 
costtoremed ,,». .:-.-.. \ 
•t f> i ollection UJ&IS to enforce correction oi uic breach. See general!'- K.. 
781-89. The defective work performed b> Subcontractor, not the arbitrary dt-k-rmination 
of the trial cot irt, led to the reduced contractual recovery. 
system. Mr. Lynn Padan explained that Contractor, during the design phase, advised the 
owner's design representatives (architect and mechanical engineer) that the "last thing 
that the owner needed was a VFD, variable frequency drive, and a computer 
monitoring—a control system that cannot be managed by the owner or the maintenance 
individual without getting a technician with a computer to set the system parameters." 
Contractor recommended to the Owner's representatives that the mechanical system be as 
Mmple as possible, controlled by individual unit thermostats. R. 900, pp. 26-28. 
in-erestingly, the type of computer controlled mechanical system-with VFD (variable 
frequency drive) that Contractor recommended again^ is ::ic t\ pe of system :hat 
Subcontractor installed, and Contractor rejected, and the inal court ordered tv replaced. 
10 
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III. Subcontractor's Failure to Provide Written Notice of the Design Defect was a 
Material Breach, Depriving Contractor of Its Bargained-for Expectation. 
Subcontractor asserts on appeal that its failure to give written notice of a known 
design defect in the mechanical system was not a material breach of the contract. Brief 
of Appellee, p. 35. The trial court, however, expressly found such to be a "most material 
breach" of the subcontract. R. 675-76, 689. The trial court found that the parties had 
expressly bargained for written notice of "any design defect" and that the subcontractor 
had "an absolute duty to immediately provide written notice thereof to the contractor." 
R. 670-71; see also R. 674-76 (including Finding #12, where the trial court discusses its 
rational in finding that Subcontractor's breach was material).2 
The determination of whether a breach of contract constitutes a material breach is 
a question of fact. Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Management, 2005 UT App 430, ^ 26, 124 
P.3d 269. The Orlob court stated: 
It is well-settled law that one party's breach excuses further performance by the 
non-breaching party if the breach is material. Whether a breach of a contract 
constitutes a material breach is a question of fact [. . . ] , which we review under a 
"[...] The court finds and concludes that given the strong language of paragraph 10, 
emphasized above by the court, that Shamrock has an absolute duty to advise contractor 
in writing of a change in equipment or design deficiency. The burden was on Shamrock 
to obtain that approval FROM CONTRACTOR, not from an engineer with whom 
Shamrock had no contract. While obviously Bartee could have and should have done 
more to follow through, the court concludes that under the Subcontract it was Shamrock's 
responsibility to obtain Daedalus' consent by advising Daedalus in writing, and that duty 
under the contract was not fulfilled by an oral statement well before the contract was 
even signed. Even if Subcontractor is correct that at the time of advising Daedalus there 
was no written contract, that duty arose when the contract was signed. If, as Shamrock 
claims, the possible danger of having an incompatible system was life threatening, the 
court finds and concludes that the duty on Shamrock, negotiated for by Daedalus, is 
clear." R. 674-76 (emphasis original). 
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clearly erroneous standard. As we stated above, to challenge a district court's 
finding of fact, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the 
finding and then demonstrate that the evidence r legally insufficient to support the 
finding e\en \\Ycr. \ v n i n u i' :^ - i :!/b' ^os i Mr •*• \b •* ^ t1l(i court below, 
Ork )b i \ Wa salt :h Medical Management, 2005 U'l App 430, *j| 26 (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
Subcontractor acknowledges that the issue it is challenging is a questioi i of fact, 
ami therefbm: siibfi't, t In 1hc marshaling requirement. Brief of Appellee, p. 3. 
Notwithstanding, it appears that Subcontractor dev^ n« .utempt to marshal the e\ idv-v c 
in support of the trial court'* • indium (Subcontractor's breach was a "most .tu.u ..-.. 
I (v • onstraf - • •*••••. s lei.»all\ insufficient In MI| • v 
even when viewing the finding in a light most favorable to the court below. Or I oh. 2n(H 
I JT App at 126; Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol Inc., 2009 I JT 81,117, 222 I >.3d 
. t on^eqviU.^ . : - n.: 
i ' v , j w iu'lb vviiiioul merit because the is^uc L not trained or discussed in 
liohi of the controlling standard of review, which necessitates marshaling, Moreov er, in 
the absence of proper marshaling this Court traditional l> assumes the evidence adduced 
• i • -.-. *• • • . : . . . - , . . • . . . - I n . -f.Mn,. 1 raco Steel, 2009 UT 
: : - " • " eitino Chen, 2004 1 r 82 * i° 100 P 3c! ! !" r?< the evidence is inadequately 
marshaied. »h.* court assumes that .*.. ,; . u i g s a r e a c k v . a u / > supported r>\ ine 
evidence.") 
Respectfully, any attempt by Subcontractor to marshal the evidence would fail as 
there is more than adequate evidence for the trial court, to find that Subcontractor's breach 
12 
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was material. See % 10 of the subcontract, App. B-l; see also testimony of A. Wright (R. 
900, pp. 63-72), in which Mr. Wright explained why it was so important3 for the 
Contractor to receive notice of a design defect and why Contractor specifically negotiated 
110 of the subcontract, requiring written notice from the subcontractor of any discovered 
or known design defect in the mechanical system. 
IV. The Subcontract Allowed Contractor to Withhold Payment, and Subcontractor 
Offers No Substantive Refutation or Analysis of the Subcontract. 
In the Brief of Appellants, Owner and Contractor provided detailed analysis of the 
subcontract between Contractor and Subcontractor. This analysis included recitation of 
at least seven contractual provisions that specifically allow Contractor to make 
contractual withholdings from Subcontractor. See Brief of Appellant, pp. 22-28. Owner 
and Contractor also supplied factual support and record cites to afford contextual 
application of the subcontract. See id. 
In response, Subcontractor makes the bald assertion thatt Owner and Contractor are 
"misleading]" the Court in arguing for enforcement of the subcontract. Brief of 
Appellee, p. 38. Not only is Subcontractor's assertion unfounded, but a succinct review 
of Subcontractor's statements on the issue of contractual interpretation shows that 
Subcontractor's statements are simply inaccurate or not germane to the interpretation of 
the subcontract. The following five examples are illustrative: 
3
 See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §241 cmt. b. (2011): "In 
construction contracts, for example, defects affecting structural soundness are ordinarily 
regarded as particularly significant." 
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p i Subcontractor's Brief states that'fii! \\w MII>M:IUK noiier ha> ai\\a> - peiioimed 
correct!;} It still does." ' Brief of Appellee, p 38. 
J i n u ^ - - " v • f . iound that: 
The boiler had two components, one of which ran the water at 1 80 degrees and it 
circulated through IIK huilding and provided the hea\ It was to ne cooled h\ ; • 
other function, cooler water that ran the culinan water, lor shower> and wast r •„ 
and such, at 120 degrees. In feet Shamrock had tailed to put a mixer val\ e in 
which affected the flow of water through the building and the cooler water from 
the culinary system was not being mixed with the original i 80 degree water and ^o 
the radiant air was alw ays too hot, unless the boner w as turned down \ • •; •• 
some h v,cr temperature When ihal new mixer vahe was installed, the over 
heating problem ceased. The court finds that Shamrock did not do the worK 
properlv 3rd dnl not install thai mixer \ ahv pro.vrh originalh ^^v 'TV.I K • .• / 
2005. 
R. 684-85; see also R. 689. This is in addition to the numerous other problems with 
Subcontractor's work, including failing lo p i - \ id;, written notice of a design defect and 
intent to substitute equipment. • * . . * . • *- • • - 11 hiding thai such 
was ""ii most material hreiich") 
(2) Subcontractor's Brief states that: "Daedalus and Silver Baron did iv>t infon 1 
Shamrock they were w uhhokiing paym.en.ts to enforce the contract ; wxci e> vppei .ee. p. 
38 
Again, to the contrary; on Februarx 22. 2005 and April 26, 2005, Mr A Ian Wright, 
on behalf of Contractor, sent written nui 11 u ai ions to Subcontractor regarding the 
defective \ v ( )ii E' K s D 18 D-22; If IJ: >: > . > i : 1 »< , I On \ |: >i 11.26 2005, C< >nt .1 1 1 < n 
requested that the defective work and equipment be remedied and specificall) referencing 
contractual provisions to be enforced. Ex. D-22; App. D-1 ; see also R. 687, The April 
, o: - h ;ic; siau. * in. its opening sentence that ,4[t]here are se v eral outstanding issues 
14 
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and some serious equipment issues that we need to address prior to closing out the 
contract for the [Project] between Shamrock and Daedalus." Id. The letter goes on to 
state that "[Daedalus] would also like to be able to pay all monies remaining on the 
contract; however, if no immediate action is taken by Shamrock to resolve all outstanding 
equipment issues, Daedalus will resolve them as provided for in the contract documents, 
including but not limited to the hiring of outside consultants, engineers, and mechanical 
subcontractors to remedy any defects." Id. 
(3) Subcontractor's Brief states that: "They [i.e., Owner and Contractor] never 
asked Shamrock to replace the boiler." Brief of Appellee, p. 38. 
In contrast to Subcontractor's claims, the trial court found that "On April 26, 2005, 
Daedalus sent a letter to Shamrock asking, among other things, that the defective 
equipment be replaced." R. 687. The April 26, 2005 letter from Mr. Alan Wright states 
that "[a]t this point I see no alternative but to replace the unstable equipment, and am 
formally requesting that you do so immediately." Ex. D-22; App. D-1. Moreover, as the 
trial court found, the very boiler installed by Subcontractor "was not equivalent" (R. 
689), was installed without notice (id.), and was not what was contracted for (id.; R. 686). 
(4) Subcontractor's Brief states that: "They [i.e., Owner and Contractor] owed the 
majority of Shamrock's claim since December 2004." Brief of Appellee, p. 38. 
This statement, which Subcontractor supports solely by citing to testimony from 
its own vice-president/CFO (Brief of Appellee, p. 38; R. 899, p. 31), is not persuasive 
and relies on no analysis of the parties' contract. The subcontract, as evidenced by 
Sections 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, and 17, provides otherwise. Exs. D-2, D-7; Apps. B-l, B-2. 
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Payment was properly withheld by Contractor under the subcontract, as a critical analysis 
of that instrument shows. 
notice of default required by the contract/" Brief of Appellee, p. j 9. 
Nothing in subcontract Sections 4. 5. 6. 10 11 1 n r~ 17. which provisions 
Contractor seeks to enforce, i eqi lires . * I v 2 D- / ; \ pps B 1 
B-2. fhe citation to which Subcontractor refers relates only to Section 15 of the 
subcontract which j s - rcmeth not exclusive u< other contractual remedies. S< < id. c * q 
S p v C l i v u i i v -. X v ,,- .1, ; * ^ l a u ' . L . . . : s'- •. • . . . . : iti M , . J . . _ ;i .;,,;- .
 Vr .. 
remedies " mr *'• * * * M.,-n! '- ;.•*•,•
 r r - , .-\;;- - MC 
remedies in Section 15. 1/x I)-2, § 15, App. Ii-1. 
Subcontractor^ eiiort^ to re-characteri/c t ontractor\ withholding oi payments 
Subcontractor's position on this issue. 
The trial court found that Subcontractor breached the agreement by failing to 
689) (concluding that such breach was "a most material breach"), that the boilers and 
related venting system, substituted by Subcontractor were installed without notice to 
685, 689)5 that Subcontractor's failure to property install a mixer valve cai ised serioi is 
overheating problems of the building even months after "substantial v\>mpIeiuMf (k *>82-
<••.  ^VM concluding that Subcontractor fd • • : . ilw WM*K property anu u - w; i * 
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that mixer valve properly [ ] until mid February 2005"), and that Subcontractor was 
responsible for either replacement of the substituted boiler and allied venting system or 
the cost of having another subcontractor provide such work and equipment (R. 690). The 
cost to remedy Subcontractor's work was later determined to be $80,000, not including 
attorney fees and collection costs to enforce correction of the breach. See generally R. 
781-89. The actions of, and defective work performed by, Subcontractor directly 
violated the subcontract. 
Under the subcontract, Contractor is entitled to withhold payment from 
Subcontractor for certain stated conditions related to Subcontractor's defective and non-
conforming work. Exs. D-2, D-7; Apps. B-l, B-2. Specifically, Contractor is allowed to 
withhold payment under Sections 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 17, and the warranty. Id. A more 
detailed analysis of these provisions was originally provided in the Brief of Appellants. 
See Brief of Appellants, pp. 20-32. 
V. As the Subcontract Allowed Contractor to Withhold Payment, an Award of 
Prejudgment Interest is Improper. 
1. Under Application of the Subcontract, Subcontractor is Not Entitled to 
Prejudgment Interest. 
In responding to Owner and Contractor's claim that Subcontractor should not be 
awarded prejudgment interest, Subcontractor mainly focuses on issues of the materiality 
of any breaches of the subcontract. Such a discussion, however, is not germane or 
relevant in determining whether prejudgment interest in this case is appropriate, and is 
discussed in Section IV, supra. Subcontractor continues to assert that Owner and 
Contractor received actual, rather than written notice of a design defect, and that this 
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served as sufficient notice. Brief of Appellee. / 'r ^ trial court, however, 
determined that the lack of w ritten notice as required under the Subcontract constituted "a 
consent by advising of such in writing, and that this duty was not fulfilled with actual 
notice before the subcontract was signed. R. 675-76, 689. Also, after a supplemental 
installed by Subcontractor was "not the system desired and bargained for [by Contractor 
and Owners ™ T? ^8^-88 ^ubconlraelor. ho\\e\er\ . -ntinues to allege that Conlrvlor 
and1 .»::U*.J .. .. i . ^ \ ^ •- a / . ,.,.,, .n. - . p- ^ --j . .. °>. 
1'1T i-i-b i * *rjc: allows C ^vr.iaui and uwnei lu withhold ^'\\ nieiil iui uefieient 
or non-conforming work under at least seven different sections of the subcontract Brief 
of Appellant, Exs. l)-2. §§ 4. \ f», III I I I \ I ' 1 »• /; Adds. H-1, B-2. As Owner and 
Cnnlraelor wen; liitilled In "ullilio'ld .ill payments In Siibcontmclnr gi\ en Nubmnlrarlnr's 
breaches and deficient work, any additional award of prejudgment interest in favor of 
Subcontractor is improper. 
2. Preji u igment Intel est C \ mnot be Iwt irdec i I Ti tiil . i Definite Sim i i s I ; Ixet ;'. 
Prejudgment interest may only be awarded when a loss can be fixed as of a 
definite time and calculated with mathematical accuracy Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v, 
omitted), if damages cannot be determined with such accuru - r*.\ ; it interest is 
inappropriate. See Bjorkv April Indus,, Inc., 560 P.2d 315. ' ;! 1 (I 'lah 1977). In its 
January 29, 201 0 Memorandum Decision, ww .. uv .oiii t ^ ,,* \inn t )\\ner and Contractor 
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were entitled to the original system bargained for, and not that of Subcontractor's 
choosing. R. 690. Subcontractor was made responsible for replacing the boiler and 
venting system in question or paying the cost of having these replaced. Id. No findings 
were made as to how much this would cost until after the supplemental evidentiary 
hearing, after which the trial court determined that the amount due to Subcontractor 
should be reduced by $80,000.00. R. 785. Given that the amount of this "fix" was not 
determined until after the supplemental evidentiary hearing, the amount due to 
Subcontractor was unknown, and prejudgment interest should not have been applied. 
As Subcontractor provided incomplete and deficient work, prejudgment interest 
should not be based on the $209,915.00 figure. Rather, the $80,000.00 cost of the fix 
along with the $60,000 in attorney fees apportioned by Contractor to enforce the 
subcontract {see R. 725), should have been counted against the value of the defective 
work of Subcontractor to arrive at a more accurate determination of value, and 
prejudgment interest should never have been awarded. Subcontractor does not refute 
Owner and Contractor's argument that prejudgment interest was improper until a definite 
sum could be fixed, and mainly focuses on misconstruing the materiality of its breach in 
not providing the written notice required by the subcontract. 
3. If the Court Determines That Prejudgment Interest is Appropriate, it 
Should Be Awarded on No More Than $129,915.00 of the Judgment. 
As discussed in the Brief of Appellant, when a "breach consists of a failure to pay 
a definite sum in money or to render a performance with fixed or ascertainable monetary 
value, interest is recoverable from the time of performance on the amount due less all 
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deductions to which the party in breach is entitled " RESTATEMENT (SECOND^ ) • n 
CONTRACTS § 354(1) (2011) If any award of prejudgim m niciv^i is made, n MIOUK e^ 
costs and attorney fees Owner and Contractor have incurred (and are entitled to withhold 
for enforcing the contract both at trial and upon appeal), Again, Subcontractor does not 
provide any ref utation or position on this prong of O \ v ne i and Contractor's argi iment 
w Ith regard to the improper aw aid of pre] udgment interest. 
VI. As Expert Witnesses Were Not Identified or Designated Pursuant to I Hah R 
Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A), It Was Error for the Trial Court to Admit Expert Testimony. 
Appellants A re Entitled to a New Trial TTnd(*rTT*ah R Ch> P <O 
In response to this issi le , Si ibeonti ac * '•- ' * f 
all of the factual information elicited from its witnesses. Biiei of Appellee, pp. 43-f.\ 
Owner nnd Contractor arc nof concerned about the factual testimony these witnesses 
pro * i s» - .. > • • , - ; » . » . • : . • - ' ! Appellants, pp. 
36-43) were ai^u allowed, over Appellants' counsel's objections, ID iiive opinion 
testimony based on their experience in the construction industry " It is the expert 
The Court: It may be wrong., ant; \ uan/e and i cgrec ii ^ soineiiiiiig oi an *>pi;h 
he's licensed. R. 899, p. 95 (discussim; :he testimony of Bill Payne, Commercial 
Manager for Shamrock Plumbing, R. S9:J, ^ p. :4 : :y . 
[ ] • 
Mr. Martin: Well, Okay. If you had to grade Shamrock's performance of work on the 
project, what would you grade it? 
Mr. Chambers: Object, foundation. 
The Court: Overruled. He stated his experience oi :>ui.u. „ ca -.. 
Mr. Shoemake: I would grade them a Bn or A- in my prol^ionm opinion. 
R. 899, pp. 254 -55. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
testimony that the witnesses were allowed to offer to which Owner and Contractor object 
because it surprised and prejudiced them. 
Subcontractor argues that the opinion testimony was admissible under Utah R. 
Evid. 701. However, the scope of testimony went far beyond that allowed by ELule 701. 
See Brief of Appellants, pp. 36-43. The Advisory Committee Note indicates that Rule 
701 was amended in 2009 to reflect the Utah Supreme Court's holding in State v. 
Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, fflf 23-24, 147 P.3d 1176, adopting a bright line test between 
lay and expert witnesses.5 
The offending expert opinion testimony in question went far beyond that permitted 
under Rule 701; it was admitted based on the licensed status or substantial experience of 
the witnesses (e.g., 25 years of experience in the case of Mr. Rusty Shoemake being 
allowed to testify). As opinion testimony, it was expert testimony. See Utah R. Evid. 
702. Because it constitutes expert testimony, the parties were required to disclose to the 
opposing party "the identity of any witness who may testify as an expert at trial." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A). This disclosure rule applies to all expert witnesses, even those 
who were not retained specifically to provide expert testimony, but will, based on their 
5
 "Even more compelling, rule 701 by its explicit terms applies only to lay testimony. 
That rule states that the witness may not be 'testifying as an expert.' The reference to 'an 
expert' logically leads to rule 702, which essentially defines an expert as one who 
testifies based on 'scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.' Given the 
language of these two rules, the requirement that we give effect to all portions of a rule 
demands that we maintain a distinction between rules 701 and 702 and, accordingly, 
disallow admission of testimony under 701 where it is based on specialized knowledge. 
In essence, expert testimony-testimony based on 'scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge' - may not be admitted as lay opinion testimony under rule 701." 
Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49 at % 23 (citations omitted). 
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education, training, experience, etc., be allowed to provide opinions or otherwise testify 
as to matters beyond the normal experience of a person. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49 at fflf 
23-24. Although no expert report was required, the disclosure of the identity of any 
person who may testify as an expert was required. See Brussow v. Webster, 2011 UT 
App 193, f 3 (a party must disclose to an opposing party the identity of any witness who 
may testify as an expert at trial). 
The ultimate result of a party's failure to disclose the identity of any witness who 
may testify as an expert at trial under Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) is that the trial court shall not 
allow such witness to testify (as to expert matters) at trial or any other hearing. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 37(f) expressly prohibits the use of an undisclosed witness, subject to two 
exceptions: 
If a party fails to disclose a witness ... as required by Rule 26(a) or Rule[] 26(e)(1), 
... that party shall not be permitted to use the witness ... at any hearing unless the 
failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to 
disclose. 
Subcontractor cannot assert good cause for its failure to disclose. Six months prior 
to trial, Subcontractor's counsel informed the trial court there was no need for an expert 
witness as to his case. R. 904, p. 13. Owner and Contractor's counsel had moved the trial 
court to re-open discovery for the limited purpose of conducting two depositions and 
designating expert witnesses. See generally R. 383-86; 401-03; 904. By the time counsel 
for Owner and Contractor became involved in the case, discovery had closed, and neither 
party had designated an expert. Since the case involved a construction dispute, Owner 
and Contractor's counsel, albeit new to the case at that time, could not see how such a 
22 
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complex case could be tried without expert witnesses. Subcontractor objected to the case 
being reopened for this limited purpose and the trial court denied the request to allow an 
extension of time to designate experts for trial. See generally R. 904. Now 
Subcontractor argues, even though it was fully aware that it had not designated any 
expert witness as required by Rule 26(a)(3), and notwithstanding the clear import of Rule 
37(f) that a party may not use a non-disclosed witness, that such opinion testimony was 
merely harmless error. "Even if the trial court allowed some testimony that could be 
perceived to be expert testimony, it was harmless." Brief of Appellee, p. 46. 
Owner and Contractor's response is twofold: First, Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) is clear. 
The non-disclosed witness cannot be used unless the trial court rules on one of two 
exceptions: Good cause for non-disclosure exists or the failure to disclose was 
determined to be harmless. Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f). In this case, the trial court made no 
Rule 37(f) inquiry, and even if the trial court had made such an inquiry, the burden of 
establishing no prejudice or surprise to Appellants would have been on the Subcontractor 
as the offending or non-disclosing party, not on the party who was surprised by the use of 
the non-disclosed witness. Subcontractor's argument subtly attempts to shift the burden 
to prove the testimony from a non-disclosed witness was harmful to the surprised party, 
contrary to Rule 37(f) which places the burden on Subcontractor. 
Second, Rule 26 (a)(3)(A) serves an important function to each party receiving a 
full, impartial trial. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the general purpose of 
discovery is "to remove elements of surprise or trickery so the parties and the court can 
determine the facts and resolve the issues as directly, fairly and expeditiously as 
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possible." Ellis v. Gilbert, 429 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah 1967). In Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 
1021, 1023 (Utah 1994), Justice Zimmerman wrote: 
[Proper disclosure] gives both parties the opportunity to prepare adequately for 
trial, including, among other things, deposing witnesses, investigating witnesses' 
testimony, and preparing an effective cross-examination. See, e.g., Gardner, 505 
P.2d at 52. It also encourages the parties to make a serious effort to investigate the 
facts and discover all relevant witnesses in a timely manner. Finally, it furthers 
the orderly and efficient administration of justice by avoiding trial delays which 
might otherwise be necessary to accommodate the need to prepare for a surprise 
witness. 
Concerning the disclosure of expert witnesses and trial preparation, this Court 
recently observed in Brussow, 2011 UT App 193 at ^ 8: 
Formal disclosure of experts is not pointless. Knowing the identity of the 
opponent's expert witnesses allows a party to properly prepare for trial, including 
attempting to disqualify the expert testimony ..., retaining rebuttal experts, and 
holding additional depositions to retrieve the information not available because of 
the absence of a report. 
(citing Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303, ]f 17, 141 P.3d 629)(internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
The admission of expert testimony in this instance was harmful. It was not 
expected. It could not have been anticipated, as the usual consequence of not disclosing 
the identity of any person to testify as an expert witness is the exclusion of the witness's 
testimony (or at least that portion which was opinion or expert testimony) under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 37(f). The pretrial order which denied counsel's motion to reopen discovery for 
the limited purpose of designating expert witnesses misled Owner and Contractor's 
counsel to believe that no expert testimony would be allowed by either party. As such, 
counsel for Owner and Contractor did not prepare their own expert witnesses, or prepare 
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material to disqualify any of Subcontractor's witness who would testify as to expert 
matters, or prepare rebuttal expert testimony. When the trial court decided to admit the 
expert testimony it was completely contrary to the trial court's pretrial order and was a 
total surprise. See Brief of Appellants, pp. 36-43. Had Appellants' counsel known that 
the trial court (notwithstanding its pretrial order) would allow the use of expert witnesses, 
then trial preparation and case presentation would have been much different, particularly 
with regards to the damages Owner and Contractor suffered as a result of Subcontractor's 
"most material breach." Given the several salient purposes discussed above relative to 
timely disclosure, the clear mandate of Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3) for disclosure of the 
identity of all persons who will offer expert testimony, and the mandatory nature of Utah 
R. Civ. P. 37(f), it is difficult to understand how it can be argued that the introduction of 
expert testimony under the circumstance of this case was merely harmless error. 
Respectfully, it was not harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Subcontractor's arguments addressing reversal of 
the trial court's ruling setting aside default judgment; recovery in quantum meruit, and 
the materiality of its contractual breach should be rejected. 
Owner and Contractor request that the Court of Appeals reverse the trial court's 
Conclusions of Law regarding the interpretation and application of the contract, 
remanding the matter to the trial court for a determination as to the exact amount 
Contractor was entitled to withhold. Upon remand, Owner and Contractor request 
specific instructions that the contract expressly allows Contractor to withhold payment 
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from the Subcontractor to enforce the subcontract, including the anticipated enforcement 
costs and attorney fees incurred to remedy the Subcontractor's breach. These attorney 
fees and costs to enforce the subcontract, both at trial and upon appeal, should be 
determined and calculated as contractual damages pursuant to the parties' agreement. 
Additionally, the trial court should be reversed as to the prejudgment interest 
awarded to Subcontractor. 
Next, Owner and Contractor request that the Court of Appeals reverse the trial 
court and order a new trial. 
Lastly, Owner and Contractor request an award of their attorney fees incurred on 
appeal, also to be included as contractual damages. 
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340 West 500 North 
North Salt Lake City, Utah 84054 
RE: Lodges at Deer Valley building F 
Deer Mr. Barrus: 
There are several outstanding issues and some serious equipment issues that we 
need to address prior to closing out the contract for the Lodges Building F between 
Shamrock and Daedalus. 
I have attempted resolution with the parties involved, but as of yet have been 
unsuccessful. The reality is that the parties ultimately responsible for all contract 
related issues are you and I. Our responsibility to the owners can not be delegated 
to any other party; nor can the resolution of problems be avoided by pointing the 
finger elsewhere. 
I have had several meetings and conversations with Bill Payne, but as of yet have 
been unable to come to resolution on the outstanding issues. 
I sent a letter dated February 22,2005 in which I spelled out some of the issues and 
requested specific information. (See attached) To date I have not received the 
requested items. 
I met with Bill on February 10, 2005 and we agreed that he would provide the 
following things, which I spelled out in my February 22nd Letter. 
1. A list of work remaining. 
2. A request for additional time under the contract terms. 
3. A review of daily reports as backup to any requests for additional time. 
4. A summary of fixture costs and overage. 
This information was not received and Daedalus submitted its owner change 
requests without including an extension of time for Shamrock. 
I specifically asked Bill for his understanding of the actual contract date of 
substantial completion as reflected by the contract documents, and any approved 
extensions of time. The contract currently indicates a completion date for 
Shamrock's work of September 20,2004 with a $1,500 daily penalty. 
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Paragraph 9- SCHEDULE: Clearly allows for revisions in the work Schedule and the 
Subcontractor's responsibilities relating to such schedule changes. 
Paragraph 10- SUBCONTRACTOR CHANGE ORDERS spells out the 
Subcontractor's responsibilities to provide immediate documentation and notice of 
any Change requests in the contract amount or completion date. 
No requests for additional time were submitted during the course of construction, 
however several Subcontractor Change Orders were submitted and approved in 
which it was agreed that no additional time would be required. I personally had 
conversation with Bill about the pending contract deadline and it was agreed that no 
additional time was necessary. 
I indicated to Bill in a November email that if Shamrock could achieve substantial 
completion by December 10,2004, Daedalus might choose not to pursue delay 
penalties. This did not occur, and in fact, the contract work remains incomplete as of 
today. Conditional TCO was achieved on December 17,2004. It was agreed that 
due to a high rate of occupancy, balancing would not take place until after the close 
of the ski season in April. That has not yet occurred. 
In case Bill has not communicated it directly to you, there is an even larger problem 
that persists. The boiler and water heaters are continually shutting down at random 
intervals as recently as this week. On some occasions it has been several times a 
day and on other occasions it is once a week. This has resulted in our having to 
monitor the system around the clock to prevent the additional refund of monies to 
the Hotel guests on a daily basis. Even with continual monitoring, we have refunded 
many thousands of dollars over the course of the past few months. 
Daedalus has never in its history issued a delay back charge to one of its 
Subcontractors, nor has an owner ever charged Daedalus for delays until now. In 
this case however, Daedalus has been assessed a very sizable delay penalty. 
My letter of February 22, 2005 also requests an immediate meeting of all parties 
involved to find a resolution to the equipment failures that are impacting us at the 
Lodges. No such meeting has taken place (I just receive notice of one scheduled for 
Tuesday May 3rd). I would think that given the seriousness of the problems that 
have plagued us, and the costs associated with them, that such a meeting would be 
a very high priority for Shamrock. 
Upon fire-up of the system, the units and hallways were averaging over 90 degrees, 
and in some places over 100 degrees; day and night, seven days a week in the 
middle of January. After innumerable hours, late nights and weekends spent 
personally investigating and inspecting the system It was discovered that Shamrock 
had omitted the installation of a mixing valve that prevented 160 degree boiler loop 
water from circulating throughout the entire building. Once this mixing/separation 
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valve was installed the temperature of the building loop was decreased to an 
average of 87 degrees in all units at all hours of the day. 
Heating problems have now been masked by the addition of cooling to the building 
in March, though we have no similar ability to mask the ongoing equipment failures. 
At this point I see no alternative but to replace the unstable equipment, and am 
formally requesting that you do so immediately. 
Paragraph 13 of the contract allows Daedalus to replace defective equipment and 
charge the costs to the subcontractor in accordance with paragraph 19. Allowing 
Shamrock three months to resolve the issues is more than ample time to debug any 
minor issues, and eighty nine days too long considering the costs associated with 
each shutdown during a period of full occupancy. 
The months of April and May are low occupancy months, and therefore the only time 
that will allow this work to be done without major loss of revenue to the owner. The 
replacement of defective equipment and all remaining work must be completed 
during this period of time. 
After receiving my letter detailing some of these issues and the required information, 
Bill Payne responded with a letter demanding payment. He asserted that with the 
exception of balancing, all contract work has been completed as of February 22, 
2005. He fails to acknowledge that this is almost five months behind schedule and 
did not acknowledge at all that the equipment is not functioning properly. Daedalus 
has communicated on numerous occasions that the continuing failure of the water 
systems and unit controls, combined with the inability to control the unit 
temperatures is a problem with very serious consequences, especially given that 
these units rent for as much as $1,500 each per night. 
Bills letter also makes the statement that normal retention is more than adequate to 
handle any and all verifiable claims and the balancing still remaining to be 
completed. Our contention is that the total remaining payable may not be adequate 
to replace the defective equipment and cover the costs incurred to date, let alone 
any still to come. Paragraph 5 of the contract clearly defines the Contractor's rights 
to withhold payment for the equipment and work in question. 
Paragraph 3 of Bill's letter states that Shamrock could possibly be due delay 
damages of it's own. Paragraph 9 of the contract specifically precludes such a back 
charge to the Contractor under any circumstances; although continued failures, 
improper functionality, and work still remaining would seem to preclude such an 
assertion in and of itself. I have attached a brief list of dates of work completed long 
after the hotel opened for partial occupancy, and almost six months after Shamrocks 
contract completion date. 
In addition to the aforementioned items, my letter of February 22nd also requests the 
following items:
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1. All submittals and approvals 
2. All communications with any and all involved parties 
3. All equipment specifications 
4. All equipment operation and maintenance manuals 
We have not yet received the requested information. In my review of the original 
submittals provided there was nothing relating to the boiler and/or water heaters, 
therefore I cannot address the issue with either the Architect or the Mechanical 
Engineer. To avoid an outright rejection of the equipment on that basis alone I will 
need all communications between your office and the Architect/Engineer 
I have also requested on more than one occasion an immediate meeting with all 
parties responsible in any way for the system. This meeting has not taken place. 
Without immediate action to resolve the outstanding Issues, it is likely that our 
companies will end up in litigation within weeks. I am therefore again requesting the 
needed Information and sufficient action to resolve all outstanding issues and avoid 
litigation. 
I am fully aware of how hard everyone worked on this job, and in fact believe that 
Shamrock is, and its field personnel are, dependable. I would much prefer to not be 
in this situation. I would also like to be able to pay all monies remaining on the 
contract; however, if no immediate action is taken by Shamrock to resolve all 
outstanding equipment issues, Daedalus will resolve them as provided for in the 
contract documents, including but not limited to the hiring of outside consultants, 
engineers, and mechanical subcontractors to remedy any defects. 
I trust that I will receive the needed information soon and hear from your company 
with a schedule for the work remaining. Your immediate response is requested so 
that we may resolve these issues without litigation. If we continue on a path of 




Vice President/Daedalus USA 
Cc: Lynn Padan-Daedalus USA 
Craig Elliot-EMA Architects 
Tom Colvin-Colvin Engineering 
Bret Christiansen-Colvin Engineering 
Kevin Flannery-Shamrock Plumbing 
Bill Payne- Shamrock Plumbing 
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February 22, 2005 
Bill Payne 
Shamrock Plumbing 
340 West 500 North 
North Salt Lake City, Utah 84054 
RE: Lodges Building F Equipment issues 
Dear Mr. Payne: 
We recently met in our office to discuss remaining work in progress, contract 
completion dates, persisting equipment troubles, contract close out and the 
status of final payment to Shamrock. 
You were to provide the following information: 
1. A list of work remaining. 
2. A request for additional time under the contract terms. 
3. A review of daily reports as backup to any requests for additional time. 
4. A summary of fixture costs and overage. 
I have not yet received this information, which is necessary for the preparation of 
any request for additional time and payment between Daedalus and the owners, 
and which is holding up our contract closeout with the Owners. 
As you are aware, the heating and culinary systems at the Lodges Building F 
have been experiencing problems since they were first fired up. These issues 
have as of yet not been resolved. Given that the building is part of a fully 
occupied luxury hotel, this problem is of a most critical nature and must be 
immediately and permanently resolved. 
I have allowed substantial time to pass while all parties involved have attempted 
to resolve the foiiowing persistent issues of overall system functionality: 
1. The entire building temperature is uncontrollably high. 
2. Many units are at 75-80 degrees at 6 am, and can not be cooled with 
outside air 
3. The boiler and water heaters will not stay lit for any extended period of 
time. 
4. Unit culinary hot water temperature fluctuates at random. 
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As I have investigated the above issues I have become aware of several 
situations where the equipment installation is not as originally designed for a 
number of reasons. 
Due to some of the above-mentioned problems, we have and are currently 
refunding substantial monies to unhappy guests, and we are regularly feeling the 
pressure on sales. 
Please provide a copy of all documentation relating to the current equipment 
installation; including but not limited to the following: 
1. All Submittals and Approvals. 
2. All communications with any and all involved parties 
3. All Equipment specifications 
4. Ail equipment operation and maintenance manuals. 
We should immediately schedule a meeting with all parties to discuss the 
problems and find the proper solutions. We cannot continue to experience 
equipment failures as we have been. We have been patiently allowing you the 
time to rectify the problems, but we can no longer continue to experience similar 
problems without a deadline for them to be rectified. We must also be confident 
that if the equipment remains, that it will be trouble free and that the HOA will not 
incur abnormal service charges once the warranty period is up. 
If necessary we will require that all equipment be removed and replaced with a 
stable system. 
Please forward the requested documentation immediately and schedule the necessary 





Cc: Lynn Padan - Daedalus USA, 
Craig Elliot - EMA Architects, 
Tom Colvin - Colvin Engineering 
Bret Christiansen - Colvin 
Kevin Flannery-Shamrock 
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